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Abstract: Doris argues that our choices are heavily influenced by forces that we 
wouldn’t count as genuine reasons. This unsettling conclusion is motivated by a 
debunking argument so wide-ranging that it isn’t foisted upon us by the sciences. Doris 
sometimes seems to lower his ambitions when offering instead a skeptical hypothesis 
argument, but that conflicts with his aims in the book. 
 
John Doris (2015) argues forcefully, and eloquently, that human thought and action aren’t quite 
what they seem. He deftly points to empirical research which suggests that our actions are 
commonly influenced by a wealth of unconscious and, importantly, unseemly factors: “many 
studies identify causes of behavior that are not plausibly taken as reasons for behavior” (43). One 
of his favorite examples is the finding that people appear to cheat less when there is a depiction of 
eyes watching them (e.g. Bateson et al. 2006). Few people would happily say “I did it because of 
the eye spots” (43).  
 
Human actions, Doris concludes, are often driven by unconscious and unreflective processes that 
amount to “defeaters.” These are influences “the actor is unaware of, and would not recognize as 
a reason justifying the behavior, were she so aware” (52). Doris doesn’t quite give this view a 
label. He just associates it with a “skeptical threat,” which he thinks we can avoid by adopting his 
own preferred theory of agency. 
 
Defeaters are supposed to be particularly damaging to a “reflectivist” tradition which holds that 
human thought and action are normally guided by “accurate reflection” (x) on one’s own mental 
states. Now, various other philosophers and scientists—including myself—likewise believe that 
the human mind isn’t so reflective (e.g. Watson 1975; Arpaly 2003; Seligman, Railton, 
Baumeister, & Sripada 2016; May forthcoming). However, Doris also doubts the “accurate” bit, 
suggesting that we often aren’t motivated by what we’d regard as genuine reasons. Here I want to 
suggest that the skeptical threat has been overstated, and yet a weakened version isn’t enough for 
Doris’s ambitious purposes. 
 
A Debunker’s Dilemma. So far the skeptical threat looks to be motivated by a genealogical 
debunking argument, in which some beliefs or other attitudes are allegedly influenced by illicit 
processes. Nietzsche and Freud, for example, famously attacked ordinary moral and religious 
beliefs as being influenced by wishful thinking, egoism, and rationalization. More recently, some 
philosophers argue that ordinary moral beliefs are unjustified because they have been too heavily 
shaped by extraneous evolutionary forces (e.g. Joyce 2006). Whatever the targeted attitudes, such 
debunking arguments intend to reveal that the attitudes are problematic because they’re in fact 
substantially influenced by unseemly forces (cf. Nichols 2014).  
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Genealogical debunking arguments can be made to work, particularly when informed by the 
relevant empirical research, provided they aren’t too wide-ranging (Kumar & May ms). Empirical 
evidence can reveal that some of our decisions are influenced by arbitrary factors, but it’s more 
difficult to establish that most of our behavior is so influenced. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence 
that many of our choices are influenced by good reasons (see e.g. discussion in Batson 2011; Miller 
2013; Seligman et al. 2016).  
 
With evidence on both sides, it looks like we ultimately have to do the hard work of determining 
what does drive most of our decision-making. Yet Doris can’t just show that our choices are 
slightly influenced by arbitrary factors. That would leave room for reflective direction or for being 
influenced by unreflective yet appropriate factors. We must ask: Are (a) most of our choices (b) 
substantially driven by (c) genuinely arbitrary factors?  
 
My own view is that a close examination of the empirical literature suggests otherwise (May 
forthcoming). Certainly some of the influences on our choices are truly unwelcome and arbitrary. 
For example, our choices certainly shouldn’t be determined by racial or gender bias, irrelevant 
feelings of disgust, or the mere order in which information is presented. But a comprehensive look 
at the literature, including meta-analyses, suggests such arbitrary influences are often rather small 
(see e.g. Oswald et al. 2013; Landy & Goodwin 2015; Demaree-Cotton 2016). This leaves plenty 
of room for being motivated primarily by the right reasons. For example, feeling queasy from food 
poisoning might make one think stealing is slightly worse than one would judge otherwise (May 
2014). But the reason most people don’t embezzle from their employer is because they think it’s 
unfair, harmful, disrespectful, or just plain immoral. 
 
Other choices are substantially influenced by various factors, such as group size, ambient smells, 
being in a hurry, similarity to a victim, and honor codes (see e.g. Latané & Nida 1981; Carlson et 
al. 1988; Batson 2011; Ariely 2012). But these forces, while often powerful, aren’t necessarily 
something we’d reject as non-reasons, once we examine the effects in more detail. Consider, for 
example, being in a hurry, being in a good or bad mood, or being reminded of one’s moral 
commitments. We may be happy to cite these as genuine reasons for either helping or not helping 
a stranger in minor need. Imagine: “Why didn’t I stop to help that man pick up his dropped papers? 
I was in a hurry and I’m just not in the mood to talk to anyone right now.” Even when a stranger’s 
situation appears to be dire, one has good reason not to help if one infers that no real help is needed 
because someone else will do it or everyone else who hears what’s going on isn’t helping. Even if 
one recognizes another is in serious need, feeling compassion may be a good reason for help. I 
may empathize more because the victim and I share a similar background and gender, but that may 
just draw my attention to a relevant reason to help (e.g. he’s in serious need). 
 
This isn’t just ad hoc whack-a-mole. There may well be a general dilemma here for wide-ranging 
debunkers like Doris: influences on many choices tend to be either substantial or arbitrary but not 
commonly both. Indeed, some influences may turn out to be neither substantial nor arbitrary. Eye 
spots, for example, aren’t necessarily arbitrary, for they may serve as a moral reminder that draws 
one’s attention to reasons for being fair and honest (same goes for honor codes and the like). And 
one meta-analysis of 25 studies suggests the eyes effect is small and quickly diminishes (Sparks 
& Barclay 2013). Either way, at least one of the conditions for a debunking argument isn’t met. 
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Skeptical Hypotheses. Doris might avoid this dilemma by reframing the ambitions of his argument 
and thus its explanatory burdens. At one point, he does explicitly model his approach on skeptical 
hypotheses in epistemology meant to undermine knowledge of the external world (65). Such 
perceptual skeptics argue that your evidence would be the same if you were hallucinating or being 
fed fake experiences by a Cartesian evil demon. Because you can’t rule out the possibility that 
your experiences are systematically deceiving, you don’t know there is a physical world beyond 
your senses (Brueckner 1994). The idea is not at all that this grand skeptical scenario is actual, 
only that it’s possible. 
 
Doris accordingly thinks he has only to raise the mere possibility of a skeptical scenario. There is 
a “large, odorous, and ill-tempered animal under the awning of agency,” he writes, and thus “for 
all one knows, any decision may be infested by any number of rationally and ethically arbitrary 
influences” (64). For Doris, the “critical question concerns not how often defeaters should be 
thought to obtain, but how their presence can be ruled out” (68).  
 
However, if this is the form of argument, then we didn’t need all of the empirical evidence. 
Imagination alone can generate hypothetical scenarios in which it systematically seems we’re 
motivated by good reasons though we’re not. Moreover, while philosophers have long been 
fascinated with this form of argument, it’s not necessarily because they find it compelling.  
 
Perhaps Doris’s idea is that his skeptical hypothesis argument should be more persuasive because 
there is some positive scientific evidence that the skeptical scenario is actual (compare Sinnott-
Armstong 2006). Nevertheless, skeptical hypothesis arguments make no claims about the actual 
genealogy of the relevant mental states. The only empirical claim in such arguments is about the 
actual character of one’s evidence—namely, that it can’t rule out the skeptical scenario—but this 
isn’t a claim about the source of one’s attitudes (May 2013). So, given Doris’s explicit and 
extensive appeal to evidence that our choices and decisions are in fact influenced by arbitrary 
factors, he seems to be offering a wide-ranging debunking argument.  
 
Doris presumably requires a debunking argument anyway for his purposes. Skeptical hypothesis 
arguments lead to a sweeping denial of knowledge. Perceptual skeptics conclude that we don’t 
know there’s an external world; Doris concludes we don’t know our behavior is defeater-free. 
Such negative conclusions cut both ways: we neither know that we are, nor that we aren’t, 
perceiving an external world or acting for good reasons. Doris, however, aims to establish the 
positive claim that much of our behavior is in fact influenced by defeaters. His rejection of 
reflectivism, for example, relies on knowledge of what the influences on our actions are. As he 
says, the argument “gets its bite from a family of empirical observations indicating that reflection 
does not [in fact] play the sort of role in self-direction that reflectivism supposes” (33). Moreover, 
Doris’s own dialogic theory of agency is motivated by such claims about the actual springs of 
human action. So it seems Doris needs to do more than raise the specter of malodorous influences 
on our choices. 
 
Conclusion. In the end, I think Doris is quite right that much of our behavior is determined by 
unreflective processes—certainly more than commonsense suggests. But only some of our choices 
are substantially determined by unsavory causes. Of course, we should still pay close attention to 
these. Even small biases can add up, generating large social problems. What’s much less clear is 
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whether small or rare biases warrant overhauls in our conception of human agency and moral 
responsibility. 
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